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ABSTRACT
There has been increasing interest by cosmologists in applying Bayesian techniques,
such as Bayesian Evidence, for model selection. A typical example is in assessing
whether observational data favour a cosmological constant over evolving dark energy.
In this paper, the example of dark energy is used to illustrate limitations in the ap-
plication of Bayesian Evidence associated with subjective judgements concerning the
choice of model and priors. An analysis of recent cosmological data shows a statisti-
cally insignificant preference for a cosmological constant over simple dynamical models
of dark energy. It is argued that for nested problems, as considered here, Bayesian pa-
rameter estimation can be more informative than computing Bayesian Evidence for
poorly motivated physical models.
Key words: cosmology: cosmological parameters, theory, observations; methods:data
analysis
1 INTRODUCTION
Bayesian techniques for estimating the posterior distribu-
tions of cosmological parameters are now well established
in astronomy (see Lahav and Liddle, 2006, and references
therein). In the last few years, cosmologists have become in-
creasingly interested in statistical techniques for model selec-
tion (for an early application see Jaffe 1996; for recent sum-
maries see Liddle, Mukherjee and Parkinson 2006; Trotta
2008). This subject has a long history and is discussed at
length in Jeffreys’ classic monograph (Jeffreys 1961). The
aim of model selection is to provide a measure by which to
rank competing models. A model that is highly predictive
should clearly be favoured over a model that is not. Model
selection, in effect, quantifies Occam’s Razor by penalizing
complicated models with many parameters that need to be
finely tuned to match the data. A topical example of model
selection applied to cosmology is in assessing whether ob-
servational data favour dynamical dark energy over a cos-
mological constant (for recent discussions see Szydlowski,
Kurek and Krawiec 2006; Liddle, Mukherjee, Parkinson and
Wang 2006; Sahle´n, Liddle and Parkinson 2007; Serra, Heav-
ens and Melchiorri 2007). This is the example that we will
use in this paper.
Models can by ranked by computing the Bayesian Evi-
dence, E, defined as the probability of the data D given the
model M ,
E(M) =
∫
dθP (D|θM)π(θ|M), (1)
where π(θ|M) is the prior distribution of model parameters
θ and P (D|θM) is the likelihood of the parameters under
model M . The ratio of the Evidences for two models,
B12 = E(M1)/E(M2), (2)
also known as the Bayes factor, provides a measure with
which to discriminate between the models. If each model is
assigned equal prior probability, the Bayes factor gives the
posterior odds of the two models. A value for B12 of or-
der unity indicates that there is little to choose between the
two models but a value of, say, B12 <∼ 0.01 suggests that the
data strongly favour model 2 over model 1⋆. The compu-
tation of Evidence can be challenging since it requires the
evaluation of an integral (1) over the entire likelihood func-
tion. This can take many hours of supercomputer time if
the cost of evaluating likelihood function at a single point
within a multi-dimensional parameter space is large. Rather
than compute the Evidence, some authors have used prox-
ies such as the Bayesian Information Criterion, which can
be computed from the maximum of the likelihood function.
The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and various in-
formation theoretic criteria for model selection are discussed
by Liddle (2004, 2007) and by Trotta (2008); these will not
be discussed in any detail in this paper which will focus on
the Evidence defined by equation (1).
The application of Bayesian Evidence to cosmology has
not met with uniform approval. The methodology has been
attacked vigourously recently by Linder and Miquel (2007),
and defended even more vigourously by Liddle et al. (2007).
This author agrees with the statistical analysis of Liddle et
al. (2007). Nevertheless, our conclusions are more in sympa-
thy with those of Linder and Miquel, namely that Bayesian
Evidence is of limited use for many applications to cosmol-
ogy.
The main reason for reaching this conclusion is that the
very concept of a model is subjective in many cosmological
⋆ Many authors have used qualitative guidelines suggested by
Jeffreys (1961) to interpret Bayes factors, see Section 3.
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applications. Ideally, one would like to test a physically well
motivated model, rather than adopting a phenomenological
parameterisation, but this is rarely possible in cosmology
because the underlying physics is poorly understood. As is
evident from equation (1) computation of Bayesian Evidence
requires assumptions concerning the prior distributions of
any parameters specifying a model. Again, in cosmology we
rarely have strong guiding principles to help us choose priors.
Bayesian Evidence is useful in situations where hypotheses
are well motivated and when there are symmetries, or other
information, to guide the choice of priors. (Specific exam-
ples are given in the textbook by Mackay 2003). Perceived
difficulties with ‘subjective’ choices of priors are, of course,
at the heart of the long-standing debate between ‘Frequen-
tists’ and ‘Bayesians’ (see for example, Kendall and Stuart
1979, §21; Jaynes 2003) and this paper has nothing new to
add to this well-worn discussion. But even if one approaches
statistics from a Bayesian point of view, as this author does,
the difficulties involved in defining models and priors must
be appreciated when interpreting Bayesian Evidence.
In this paper, I will use the problem of dark energy
to illustrate the points outlined in the previous paragraph.
In the next Section, I begin with a discussion of ‘skater’
models (Linder 2005; Sahle´n, Liddle and Parkinson 2007) to
demonstrate the subjectivity involved in defining a model.
The skater parameterization is clearly unphysical and should
be thought of as an approximation to a more complex model
requiring more free parameters and uncertain priors. This is
typical of many parameterizations of evolving dark energy. I
will then discuss the constraints on simple dynamical mod-
els of dark energy, including a ‘thawing’ field evolving in a
linear potential and a ‘freezing’ tracker model, to illustrate
problems associated with priors. Some general comments on
model selection are presented in Section 3 and the conclu-
sions are summarized in Section 4.
2 TESTING DARK ENERGY
The discovery that the Universe is accelerating has stimu-
lated an enormous amount of interest in dynamical models
of dark energy (see for example, the comprehensive review
by Copeland, Sami and Tsujikawa 2006). A particularly sim-
ple class of models is based on a scalar field φ evolving in a
potential V (φ). The equation of motion of the field is
φ¨+ 3Hφ˙ = −V ′(φ), (3)
where dots denote time derivatives, H = a˙/a where a is the
scale factor, and the prime denotes a derivative with respect
to the field value φ. In this paper, we focus on comparing this
class of dynamical models with the hypothesis that the dark
energy is a cosmological constant, i.e. V = V0 = constant.
2.1 The difficulty of defining a physically well
motivated model.
In a ‘skating’ model (Linder 2005) the potential is assumed
to be flat, V = V0, but the scalar field has some kinetic
energy, φ˙ 6= 0. This leads to a non-trivial equation of state
that evolves as
dw
dlna
= −3(1− w2). (4)
What prior should we choose for φ˙? The equation of motion
gives φ˙ ∝ a−3, i.e. the field velocity decays adiabatically as
the Universe expands. So a physically well motivated prior
for φ˙ would be a delta function centred around the value φ˙ =
0, making the model indistinguishable from a cosmological
constant.
Sahle´n, Liddle and Parkinson (2005, 2007) have derived
constraints on skater models using distant supernovae and
other cosmological data. The data do not constrain strongly
the field velocity φ˙0 at the present day and so the limits on
φ˙0 simply reflect the maximum value allowed by their choice
of prior on the kinetic contribution to the cosmic density at
high redshift. It can be argued that if the likelihood func-
tion is flat over the full domain of a parameter, then the
Evidence is independent of the prior (Liddle et al. 2007).
But how does one specify the domain of a parameter? As
discussed in the next Section, if the likelihood does vary over
the parameter range, perhaps because the data have been
used to suggest the range, then the posterior distributions
of other parameters, such as V0, and the Evidence (1) will
depend on the choice of prior.
In fact, the problem is more serious than outlined above.
We have described the skater model here because it is easy
to see that it is a proxy for a more complicated model involv-
ing more parameters (and priors). This is true of many sim-
ple parameterizations of dynamical dark energy. How could
skating behaviour be realized in practice? In the following
example †
V (φ) =
M4+α
φα
+ V0, (5)
the first term in (5) is a ‘tracker’ potential with an attractor
solution (Steinhardt, Wang and Zlatev 1999). It is therefore
easy to arrange for the field to follow the attractor solution
at high redshift and then glide on to the constant part of
the potential with some finite φ˙ at low redshift. As a spe-
cific example, assume V0 = 2H
2
0 , α = 4, M
4+α = 0.05H20 ,
then at the present day Ωφ0 = 0.71, wφ0 = −0.97 and
φ˙0/H0 = 0.246 (actually outside the range on φ˙0/H0 permit-
ted by the priors assumed by Sahle´n et al. 2007). We would
argue that equation (5) with attractor initial conditions is
a physically better motivated model than a simple flat po-
tential with some arbitrary choice of initial φ˙. Of course,
this is a more complicated ‘skater-like’ model and requires
the specification of priors on three parameters M , α and V0.
Furthermore, as the above example shows, for reasonable
values of α it is difficult to get a substantial deviation from
wφ0 = −1. The additional parameters therefore allow mod-
els that show deviations from the dynamics of a cosmological
constant at low redshift, but the differences are small.
2.2 Dependence on priors
To make contact with previous work, we first analyse the
simple phenomenological model with a constant equation of
state parameter w0. Evidence computations for this model
† We use natural units, c = h¯ = 1. The reduced Planck mass
is Mpl = (8πG)
−1/2 = 2.44 × 1018GeV and will be set to unity
unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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have been presented by Liddle et al. (2006) and Serra et al.
(2007), using broadly similar data to those used here.
We use a compilation from the following web ad-
dress http://braeburn.pha.jhu.edu/∼ariess/R06/Davis07 R07 WV07.dat,
listing redshifts, distance moduli and their errors for Type
1a supernovae. These data were used in Davis et al. (2007)
and consist of combined data from Wood-Vasey et al. (2007)
and Riess et al. (2007). Supernovae with redshifts less than
0.02 were discarded to limit systematic errors associated
with local peculiar velocities, leaving 181 supernovae with
a maximum redshift of 1.755 (sn1997ff). Following Sahle´n
et al. (2007), in addition to the constraints on luminosity
distances from Type 1a supernovae, we add constraints on
the CMB peak shift parameter R at the redshift of decou-
pling and on the baryon acoustic scale parameter A at the
characteristic depth of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (Eisen-
stein et al. 2005), assuming Gaussian distributions with
R(zdec = 1089) = 1.70± 0.03, (6a)
A(z = 0.35) = 0.474 ± 0.017. (6b)
For definitions of the parameters R and A, and references to
the numerical values listed in (6a, 6b), we refer the reader
to Wang and Mukharjee (2006) and Sahle´n et al. (2007).
Spatial curvature is assumed to be zero, thus a model
is specified by the Hubble parameter h (in units of
100 kms−1Mpc−1, the cosmological matter density parame-
ter at the present day, Ωm, and the equation of state parame-
ter w0. To facilitate comparison with Serra et al. (2007), we
adopt the identical flat priors for Ωm and h with ranges
0.1 ≤ Ωm ≤ 0.5, 0.56 ≤ h ≤ 0.72 (and we do not at-
tempt to justify these choices). For w0 we will adopt a flat
prior over the range −1 ≤ w0 ≤ −1/3, i.e. excluding the
‘phantom’ regime w0 < −1, and a flat prior over the range
−2 ≤ w0 ≤ −1/3.
Figure 1 shows likelihood contours in the w0−Ωm plane
marginalised over the Hubble parameter h. The results are
broadly compatible with the analysis presented by Serra et
al., though the supernova sample used here is larger and so
the contours in Figure 1 are somewhat tighter than theirs.
Note that the peak of the likelihood function is close to the
cosmological constant value w0 = −1. There is no evidence
of a shift of the contours below the phantom divide line
seen in some earlier analyses (e.g. Riess et al., 2004). There
is evidence that the older High-z Supernovae Search Team
(HZSST) data pull the solutions to w0 < −1 (see Nesseris
and Perivolaroploulos 2007) indicative of (unknown) system-
atic errors in the earlier data. The HZSST data are not in-
cluded in the sample used here.
The Evidence ratios for a cosmological constant and the
constant w0 model are listed in Table 1 for various choices
of prior on w0. The results in Table 1 agree well with those
of Liddle et al. (2006) who used the distant supernovae data
of Astier et al. (2006). The Evidence ratios in Table 1 are
about a factor of two larger than those computed by Serra
et al. (2006). Much of this difference is caused because the
latter authors include the old HZSST data which pull the
likelihood function further into the phantom regime hence
penalising the Λ model.
The Evidence ratios in this Table indicate a marginal
preference for the Λ model (see Section 3.1 for remarks on
the interpretation of Evidence), but none of the Evidence
ratios are high and it is easy to change them by factors
Figure 1. Constraints on w0 and Ωm from the data (primarily
distant supernovae) described in the text. The ellipses show 1,
2 and 3σ contours of the marginalized likelihood function. The
maximum of the likelihood function is shown by the cross.
Table 1: Evidence Ratios
Model Prior EΛ/EQ ln(EΛ/EQ)
constant w −1 ≤ w0 < −0.333 3.42 1.23
constant w −2 ≤ w0 < −0.333 6.15 1.82
constant w −1.4 ≤ w0 < −0.6 2.95 1.08
linear 0 ≤ V0 < 3 1.58 0.46
linear 0 ≤ V0 < 6 2.59 0.95
inverse power 0 ≤ α < 6 8.59 2.15
inverse power 0 ≤ α < 2 2.78 1.02
inverse power 0 ≤ α < 1 1.40 0.33
Note: EΛ denoted the Evidence for a model with a cosmologi-
cal constant Λ and EQ denotes the Evidence for the dynamical
dark energy models discussed in the text. The first three lines list
Evidence ratios for the model with constant w0. The next two
lines list Evidence ratios for the model with a linear potential as
discussed in the text. The last three lines list Evidence ratios for
tracker models with an inverse power-law potential.
of a few by changing the range of the prior on w0. This
is demonstrated in the third line of the Table, where the
Evidence has been recomputed assuming a flat prior over
the narrower range −1.4 ≤ w0 < −0.6. The dependence on
the prior is not particularly serious in this case, because none
of the entries in Table 1 provide strong evidence to favour
or disfavour the Λ model.
Following on from the discussion in Section 2.1, we
would argue that a model with a flat prior on a constant
value of w0 is not particularly well motivated. We therefore
seek a simple dynamical model, derivable from a potential
V (φ), with as few free parameters as possible. One such
model is based on the linear potential‡,
‡ Note that the dimensionless parameters appearing in this equa-
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Figure 2. The Figure to the left shows regions contours of fixed values of Ωφ0 and wφ0 for the linear ‘thawing’ model discussed in the
text. No solutions are possible in the shaded regions. The Figure to the right shows the likelihood function determined from the data
discussed in the text after marginalising over the Hubble parameter. The contours delineate 1, 2 and 3σ confidence regions.
V (φ) = V0 + V
′φ, (7)
with a negative gradient V ′. (For discussions of the linear
potential see e.g. Dimopoulos and Thomas 2003; Kallosh et
al. 2003; Avelino 2005.) The zero point of the field value has
no significance and so can be set to zero at some starting red-
shift zi. The field is locked by Hubble friction (equation 3)
until the Hubble parameter drops sufficiently that the field
begins to roll. At this point, the dark energy will show in-
teresting dynamical behaviour. Eventually, the potential will
become negative and the Universe will collapse. This simple
model therefore displays ‘thawing’ behaviour in the nomen-
clature of Caldwell and Linder (2005), followed by ‘cosmic
doomsday’ in the nomenclature of Kallosh et al. (2003).
This model has a weak dependence on the starting red-
shift, which we fix to be the decoupling redshift zi = 1089.
We ‘absorb’ this weak dependence into the priors on V0 and
V ′. A model is therefore specified by these two parameters.
The left hand panel of Figure 2 shows contours in the V0−V ′
plane with constant values of Ωφ0 (the present day dark en-
ergy density) and wφ0 (the present day dark energy equa-
tion of state parameter). The shaded regions delineate areas
where no solution exists. Figure 1 shows that the data favour
models with Ωm ∼ 0.27 and w0 <∼ − 0.85. The marginalised
likelihood function for the linear model is therefore expected
to delineate a narrow banana centred around the Ωφ0 ∼ 0.7
line. This is indeed what is found, as illustrated in the right
hand panel of Figure 2.
To compute the Evidence, priors need to be specified
for the parameters V0 and V
′. But how do we choose these
priors? For spatially flat models with V ′ = 0, the value of V0
must lie within the range 0 ≤ V0 < 3. However, if we allow
non-zero values of V ′, V0 can lie outside this range. One
possibility would be to choose a flat prior over the region
tion are related to dimensional parameters as φ/Mpl → φ,
V0M
−2
pl
H−20 → V0 and V
′M−1
pl
H−20 → V
′.
of the V0 − V ′ plane corresponding to models which are
accelerating at the present day. However, this choice of prior
is hardly compelling.
In fact, the choice of prior is not particularly critical for
the interpretation of Figure 2 because current data provide
relatively poor constraints on V ′. This is illustrated by the
last two lines in Table 1 which list the Evidence ratios as-
suming a uniform prior in V ′ over the full range shown in
Figure 2 (0 ≤ −V ′ < 6) and a uniform prior in V0 over the
ranges 0 ≤ V0 < 3 and 0 ≤ V0 < 6 (excluding the hatched
regions). There is no significant evidence to favour Λ over
the dynamical model, and it is clear from inspection of Fig-
ure 2 that the higher Evidence ratio in the last line of Table
1 is largely a consequence of the increased range of the prior
on V0.
As a final example, we consider a ‘tracker’ model with
the Ratra-Peebles (1998) potential
V (φ) =
M4+α
φα
. (8)
An introductory review of this model is given by Martin
(2008). As mentioned above, this potential has an attractor
solution which drives wφ towards the solution
wφ → αwB − 2
α+ 2
, (9)
while the scalar field is subdominant (where wB is the equa-
tion of state parameter of the background matter). This
model is an example of a ‘freezing’ model in the terminology
of Caldwell and Linder (2005). We set φ˙ = 0 at high redshift
(z = 10000) and choose the initial value of φ so that the field
locks on to the attractor solution without overshoot. The low
redshift behaviour is therefore fixed by the attractor solu-
tion so the model is characterised by the two parameters M
and α defining the potential (8).
The marginalised likelihood for this model is shown in
Figure 3, (using the same observational data as for Figures
1 and 2). Evidently, the data constrain the power-law index
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
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Figure 3. Constraints on the parameters of the inverse power
law potential α and M . As in Figure 1, the ellipses show 1, 2 and
3σ contours of the marginalized likelihood function.
to be α <∼ 1. However, from the theoretical point of view,
there are no compelling constraints on the spectral index;
values as high as α = 6 or more have been discussed in
the literature (Steinhardt, Wang and Zlatev 1999, Martin
2008) and occasionally promoted as a possible solution to
the ‘hierarchy’ problem associated with the mass scale M .
The Evidence ratios for various assumed prior ranges in α
are listed in the last three lines of Table 1. As expected,
these scale almost perfectly with the width of the prior range
assumed for α. Nevertheless, none of the Evidence ratios
in Table 3 are high and so one cannot reject the potential
(8) drawn from a broad uniform prior on α. However, it
is obvious from the likelihood function shown in Figure 3
that we can rule out the potential (8) for specific choices of
α >∼ 1.5.
3 COMMENTS ON THE APPLICATION OF
MODEL SELECTION
3.1 The Jeffreys Scale
The previous Section shows that current data, unfortu-
nately, provide relatively weak constraints on simple models
of dynamical dark energy. The highest Evidence ratios are
about ∆lnE ∼ 2 for certain choices of prior. Plausible vari-
ations on the prior of a single parameter can easily change
the Evidence ratio by ∆lnE ∼ 1 or more. Many papers on
cosmological model selection have adopted the interpretive
scale suggested in Appendix B by Jeffreys, which in the view
of this author is not sufficiently conservative. Trotta (2008)
presents a revised interpretative scale in his review, which
accords with ones intuitive assessment of the relative poste-
rior odds, B12, of two models. The two scales are compared
in Table 2.
For the dark energy examples summarized in the pre-
vious Section, if the observational data improve to give
∆ln(EΛ/EQ) >∼ 5, then it would be reasonable to conclude
that there is evidence favouring a cosmological constant. The
Table 2: Interpretive scales
Jeffreys grades Trotta (2008)
lnB12 strength of Evidence lnB12 strength of Evidence
< 1.15 not worth a mention < 1.0 inconclusive
1.15− 2.3 substantial 1.0− 2.5 weak
2.3− 4.6 strong to very strong 2.5− 5.0 moderate to strong
> 4.6 decisive > 5 strong
data are then providing strong enough constraints to over-
whelm the changes in the prior volumes illustrated in Table
1 (see Section 3.3 below). But Evidence ratios of ∆lnE ∼ 2
are clearly too small to achieve this. Many of the problems
outlined in the previous Section can be overcome by adopt-
ing a conservatively high threshold before claiming strong
evidence against particular classes of model. The threshold
may need to be set higher than ∆lnE = 5 if one (or both)
of the models involves several additional parameters with
uncertain priors.
3.2 Stating and Varying Priors
It is essential that authors computing Bayesian Evidence
state their priors carefully since these are an integral part of
the definition of a model. If there are no compelling reasons
to guide the choice of priors, then one should demonstrate
that the data overwhelm plausible variations in priors be-
fore drawing any strong conclusions on particular classes
of model. This has not been common practice in the liter-
ature. For example, Table 4 of Trotta (2008) summarizes
Evidence calculations for various cosmological model com-
parisons. Of the ten entries testing dynamical dark energy
agains Λ, only three explore variations in priors. One analy-
sis quoted in this Table (Bassett, Corasaniti and Kunz 2004)
computes Evidence for simple parameterizations of w (such
as w = w0 + w1z) without stating the prior ranges on the
parameters. These authors find ∆EΛ/EQ >∼ 5 − 6, suggest-
ing strong evidence favouring Λ. Such high Evidence ratios
are clearly at variance with the conclusions of Section 2.
3.3 Model Selection compared with Parameter
Estimation
In many cosmological applications of model selection, we are
dealing with highly nested problems. In each of the examples
discussed in Section 2, the model for dynamical dark energy
tends to the Λ model as one additional the parameter tends
to zero (w0 + 1 → 0, V ′ → 0, α → 0). In each of these
cases, the primary question of interest is whether there is any
empirical evidence that an additional parameter, λ differs
from zero. For such highly nested problems§ the Bayes factor
for model M1 (λ = 0) and model M2 (λ drawn from a prior
distribution π(λ)) is simply
B12 =
P (D|λ = 0M2)∫
P (D|λM2)π(λ|M2)dλ
, (10)
§ To simplify the following discussion, we will assume uniform
priors on all parameters.
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
6 G. Efstathiou
Table 3: Likelihood ratio compared to Evidence ratio
ln(EΛ/EQ) uniform prior
σ lnL(−1)/L(w∗) −1 ≤ w < −1/3 −1 ≤ w < −0.90
0.1 −0.03 1.22 −0.084
0.05 −0.50 1.77 −0.021
0.02 −3.12 −0.53 −2.42
0.015 −5.55 −2.67 −4.58
0.01 −12.50 −9.22 −11.11
(this is related to the Savage-Dickey density ratio, see Trotta
2007) where P (D|λM2) ≡ L(λ) is the likelihood function
marginalised over all of the common parameters). For a uni-
form prior in λ, L(λ) is just the marginalised posterior dis-
tribution of λ on M2, and from (10) we can interpret the
likelihood ratio L(0)/L(λ) as the Bayes factor for two mod-
els with delta function priors centred at λ = 0 and λ. If
we choose λ = λ∗, where λ∗ corresponds to the peak of the
likelihood function, then the Bayes factor is minimised. (For
further discussion of the relationship between likelihood ra-
tios and Bayes factors see Gordon and Trotta, 2007.) Now
suppose that the likelihood function is approximated by a
Gaussian
L(λ) = L0 exp
(
− (λ− λ∗)
2
2σ2
)
, (11)
and that we are interested in whether the parameter λ differs
from zero. The likelihood ratio L(0)/L(λ∗) is evidently
L(0)
L(λ) = exp
(
− λ
2
∗
2σ2
)
, (12)
Now assume that under model 2, the parameter λ is drawn
from a uniform distribution in the range 0 ≤ λ < λmax,
and assume further that λmax ≫ λ∗ ≫ σ. The data is then
‘informative’ (λmax ≫ σ) and suggestive that λ deviates
from zero (λ∗ ≫ σ). In this case,
E(0)
E(λ)
≈ exp
(
− λ
2
∗
2σ2
)
λmax√
2πσ
. (13)
If the exponential term dominates in (13), the Evidence ratio
is exponentially suppressed and the data swamp the depen-
dence on the prior. (In fact, in testing whether a parameter
differs from zero, Jeffreys (1961, §5.2) suggests using the
prior
π(λ) ∝ 1
(1 + λ2/σ2)
, (14)
since ‘there is nothing in the problem except σ to give a scale
for λ’. In other words, the choice of prior is driven by the
data and in this case one is reliant on the exponential factor
(13) to reject the null hypothesis.) Alternatively we might
find λ∗ <∼ σ suggesting that the parameter λ is consistent
with zero, with λmax ≫ σ, in which case
E(0)
E(λ)
≈ 2√
2π
λmax
σ
, (15)
which merely tells that under model 2 we need fine tuning
of order σ/λmax to explain the data.
As a specific example¶, imagine that future dark energy
surveys find w∗ = −0.95 ± σ (w0 ≡ (1− λ) in the notation
used above) and we test model 1 (w0 = −1, the ‘null hypoth-
esis’) against model 2 (uniform prior in w0). Table 3 lists the
likelihood ratios and Bayes factors for two choices of prior.
One can see that for σ = 0.01 the data swamp the depen-
dence on the prior and all three entries in Table 3 strongly
disfavour w0 = −1. The likelihood ratio is as informative as
the Evidence ratios in the exponentially dominated regime
since it matters little whether the posterior odds of two mod-
els are ∼ 10−6 or ∼ 10−10 – the odds are negligible in either
case . The case of σ = 0.015 is more interesting and is an
example of ‘Lindley’s paradox’ (Lindley 1957). The likeli-
hood function indicates a 3.33σ discrepancy with the null
hypothesis, yet the Evidence ratio in the third column of
Table 3 suggests weak evidence against w0 = −1. This is
simply because the Evidence ratio compares one model that
is disfavoured by the data (w0 = −1) against another model
that is disfavoured by the data (uniform distribution of λ
over the range −1 ≤ w < −1/3, requiring fine tuning at
the few percent level). Lindley’s paradox should not obscure
the fact that the likelihood peaks away from w0 = −1: the
likelihood function suggests that w0 differs from −1. and is
therefore informative. If, following future experiments, the
contours shown in Figures 1-3 tighten so that zero values
for 1 + w0, V
′, or α, are exponentially suppressed, then we
will have very strong evidence in favour of dynamical dark
energy, irrespective of priors. If the Evidence ratios for rea-
sonable choices of priors are still in the ‘ambiguous’ range
lnEΛ/EQ ∼ 2.5 − 5, a modest improvement of the the data
could potentially render the issue decisive.
Finally, let us consider the case relevant to equation
(15), namely that the likelihood function peaks at λ ∼ 0 to
within ∼ σ. The null hypothesis is then favoured if the prior
range λmax ≫ σ. But the Evidence ratio can be reduced
to unity by adjusting the prior range to be of order σ (c.f
equation 14). An ‘Occam’s Razor’ penalty for a model with
additional parameters can be realised only if: (a) one has
good arguments for choosing the prior ranges of the addi-
tional parameters and (b) the likelihood function is compact
with respect to these prior ranges.
3.4 When is Bayesian Evidence Particularly
Useful?
In the previous sub-section we have argued that the
marginalised likelihood function is informative and can pro-
vides a good indicator of whether the null hypothesis (Λ) is
disfavoured compared to dynamical energy models. Let us
suppose that Λ is indeed disfavoured by future data. In this
case, the likelihood contours in Figures 1-3 would break up
into ‘islands’ peaked away from Λ. How do we assess be-
tween these three parameterizations? Bayesian Evidence is
likely to be indispensible for this type of ‘non-nested’ model
comparison. Again, the usual caveats should apply:
(a) we should aim to compare physically well-motivated
¶ We could equally as well have used the example of the spatial
curvature Ωk or deviation of the scalar spectral index ns from
unity, as discussed by Liddle et al. (2007).
c© 0000 RAS, MNRAS 000, 000–000
Bayesian Evidence 7
models (better motivated than the skater model of Section
2.1);
(b) compare models with as few free parameters as possible
(cf the models of Section 2.2) to limit the sensitivity of the
Evidence to prior volumes;
(c) explore variations in the priors.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Bayesian inference has been applied widely for parameter
estimation from cosmological data and is relatively uncon-
troversial. The Bayesian framework can easily be extended
to model selection, but this has proved to be more contro-
versial.
There is nothing wrong with the mathematical frame-
work underlying Bayesian model selection. It is the perceived
usefulness of the framework, given difficulties in specifying
models that is at the source of the controversy. It is im-
portant to recognise that Bayesian model selection differs
in a fundamental way from Bayesian parameter estimation.
In parameter estimation, the posterior distribution on a pa-
rameter is useful because it usually become narrower as the
quality of constraining data improves. The sensitivity of the
posterior distribution to the prior therefore often dimin-
ishes dramatically with better data. This is why Bayesian
parameter estimation has proved relatively uncontroversial.
(Surprisingly so, since in cases such as estimating the CMB
quadrupole there is an irreducible sensitivity to the choice
of prior, see Efstathiou 2003).
For Bayesian model selection we need to apply ‘physical
intuition’ to select suitable models and the priors on model
parameters. Once these are chosen, the data determine the
numerical value of the Evidence (i.e. the probability of the
data given the model) via equation (1). There is no ‘up-
dating’ involved since the data return a single value of the
Evidence given the model. In Section 2, we discussed some of
the difficulties associated with defining physically well mo-
tivated models and parameter ranges. Now one can argue,
correctly, that the range of a parameter is part of the defini-
tion of a model. However, in cosmology, it is often difficult to
provide compelling arguments in favour of a particular pa-
rameter range. This is certainly the case for the dark energy
tests described in this paper. If we use the data to suggest
the parameter ranges, for example, by examining the likeli-
hood function, then a computation of (1) will be of limited
value since the probability of the data given the model will
be high by construction.
Many applications of Bayesian Evidence to cosmology
involve highly nested problems in which the primary ques-
tion of interest is whether a key parameter, λ, differs from
zero (the ‘null’ hypothesis). For such problems, we have ar-
gued that the marginalized likelihood function L(λ) is more
informative than Evidence computed for specific, and often
poorly motivated, choices of priors. If the likelihood func-
tion is exponentially suppressed at λ = 0, then we can con-
clude that there is strong evidence against the null hypoth-
esis for any reasonable choice of priors. Bayesian Evidence
is of most use is in comparing non-nested models. If we are
in the happy situation of having high quality data that rule
out a cosmological constant, then Bayesian Evidence can be
used to select between various dynamical models. But the
Evidences will only be of interest if the models and priors
are physically well motivated.
Finally, we re-iterate that the Evidence calculations pre-
sented in Table 1 show no significant evidence in favour of
a cosmological constant compared to the dynamical mod-
els of dark energy tested here. This conclusion agrees with
similar Evidence analyses of Serra et al. (2007) and Liddle
et al. (2007), using different models and somewhat different
data, but disagrees with the Evidence analysis of Bassett et
al. (2004). Several recent papers have used the Bayesian In-
formation Criterion (BIC) to claim that a cosmological con-
stant is favoured over dynamical dark energy ( Bassett et al.
2004, Davis et al. 2007; Sahle´n et al. 2007; Kurek and Szyd-
lowski 2007). However, BIC unfairly penalises models with
many parameters if these parameters are poorly constrained
by the data (Liddle 2004; Liddle 2007). If this paper is a
‘health warning’ concerning the use of Bayesian Evidence in
cosmology, it should be considered a ‘death certificate’ on
the use of approximations such as BIC if the strict criteria
for their applicability are not met (see Liddle 2007 for fur-
ther details). As the models of Section 2 show, current data
unfortunately provide relatively weak constraints on simple
dynamical models of dark energy.
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